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Future Generations: A Prioritarian View
Matthew D. Adler*
How should we take account of the interests of future generations? This question has great practical relevance. For example, it is
front and center in arguments about global warming policy. Unfortunately, the question is doubly difficult—doubly, because it not merely
implicates generic disputes about the structure of moral obligations
(disputes between consequentialists and nonconsequentialists, welfarists and nonwelfarists, and so forth), but because the appropriate
treatment of future generations implicates distinct problems that are
not resolved merely by adopting one or another generic framework.
This Article addresses the appropriate treatment of future generations within the framework of prioritarianism. In prior articles and
a forthcoming book, I argue that the “social welfare function”
(“SWF”) approach to policy choice provides a systematic, implementable, and theoretically well-grounded method for rendering policy sensitive not only to efficiency, but also to equity—to the fair dis1
tribution of well-being. In particular, I defend a “prioritarian” SWF.
A prioritarian SWF ranks outcomes using the formula

N

 g (u ( x)) —
i 1

i

where x is an outcome; ui(x) an individual utility number representing
the well-being of individual i in outcome x; and g(.) a strictly increas2
ing and strictly concave function. Because g(.) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave, changes to the well-being of worse-off individuals have greater social weight than changes to the well-being of better-off individuals. The prioritarian SWF is therefore sensitive to eq-

* Leon Meltzer Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks for
their helpful comments on this Article, or conversations about problems of future generations,
to Seth Baum, Bill Buzbee, Dan Farber, Robert Hockett, Doug Kysar, Eric Posner, Arden
Rowell, Chris Sanchirico, David Weisbach, and the participants in The George Washington Law
Review symposium at which the Article was presented in draft form.
1 See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter, ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY]; Matthew D.
Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (2006); Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2008); Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being, Inequality and Time: The Time-Slice
Problem and Its Policy Implications (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 07-17, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006871.
2 This is the appropriate formula for what I call the “core case,” where the very same N
individuals exist in all outcomes. Variations in the formula for other cases are considered below. See infra Part III.
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3

uity. This framework has firm intellectual roots, drawing both from
moral philosophy (where the distinction between prioritarian and
non-prioritarian approaches to equity has recently been much discussed), and from welfare economics (where the idea of an SWF
originates).
My claim, in this Article, is that the appropriate treatment of future generations, within the framework of prioritarianism, is straightforward in the “core case” where the intertemporal population is
fixed and finite. In other words, the same N individuals exist in all of
4
the possible outcomes of the policy choice at hand, with N < .
Things become trickier if we relax the assumption of a fixed, finite
population. One departure from the “core case” involves non-identity
problems—where there are individuals who exist in some, but not all,
of the possible outcomes. In other words, there is at least one pair of
possible outcomes x and y, such that individual i exists in x but not in
y. A related but logically distinct problem involves variation in the
size of populations. In other words, there is at least one pair of possible outcomes x and y, such that outcome x has N individuals, outcome
y has M individuals, and N  M. Finally, infinity problems arise where
some or all of the possible outcomes contain an infinite number of individuals. This can happen, in particular, if each generation contains
a finite number of individuals but time continues indefinitely.
Part I of this Article summarizes the prioritarian approach. Part
II discusses the core case. Here, I shall argue that the interests of future generations should be given the very same weight as the interests
of the present generation. Arguments to the effect that the SWF
should incorporate a utility discount factor, reflecting a pure rate of
time preference, are misconceived—at least in the core case.
Part III discusses departures from the core case: non-identity
problems, variation in the size of populations, and infinite populations. As we shall see, arguments for departing from neutrality between present and future generations become stronger in such cases.
In particular, there is a plausible argument that an individual who
does not exist in some outcomes should have her interests wholly ignored for purposes of comparing such outcomes to outcomes in which
she does exist. As for infinity cases, we shall see that a strong kind of
3 Formally, a SWF is sensitive to equity if it satisfies the “Pigou-Dalton” principle. Prioritarian SWFs are a subset of the SWFs that satisfy this principle. See sources cited supra note
1.
4 By “possible outcomes,” I mean all the outcomes in the outcome set, O, which is relevant to the choice at hand. See infra text accompanying notes 13–15.
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temporal neutrality is logically inconsistent with the principle of
Pareto superiority.
Part III tentatively concludes that neutrality should be maintained in non-identity and population-size-variation cases. It suggests
that these cases might be handled via a simple generalization of the
prioritarian formula. Outcome x is ranked as being at least as good as
outcome y iff

5

N ( x)

N ( y)

 g (u ( x))   g (u ( y)) —where N(x) is the number of
i 1

i

i 1

i

individuals who exist in x, N(y) in outcome y. The effect of this formula is to take full account of the interests of potential nonexistents
6
in comparing outcomes where they do and do not exist. As for infinite-population cases, Part III suggests that some measure of temporal neutrality might be preserved in such cases via a prioritarian variation on the “overtaking” criterion.
These conclusions, however, are much less firm and definitive
than the argument for neutrality in the core case. The main aim of
Part III is simply to acquaint the reader with the various kinds of
problems for the SWF framework that arise once we relax the assumptions of a fixed, finite population. Given the intrinsic difficulty
of these problems, and space limitations, I can hardly do more than
that.
I.

Prioritarian SWFs

The possibility of interpersonal welfare comparisons has long
been, and remains, a controversial issue among welfare economists.
Many economists still reject such comparisons and espouse policyanalytic frameworks that do not require them—for example, the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. However, a substantial number of
economists take the position that well-being is indeed comparable
across persons. These economists tend to favor the use of SWFs to
evaluate policy.
7
There is a large theoretical literature concerning SWFs, and also
more “applied” literatures, where economists deploy SWFs to evalu5

“Iff” means “if and only if.”

6

If individual i exists in outcome x but not y, and has utility ui(x) in x, the effect of the
above formula is to assign i a utility level of zero in y, and to take full account of the difference
between ui(x) and zero in ranking the two outcomes, as much as if i existed in outcome y.
7

For reviews of this literature, see Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, Utility in Social
Choice, in 2 HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 1099 (Salvador Barberà et al. eds., 2004); and
Claude d’Aspremont & Louis Gevers, Social Welfare Functionals and Interpersonal Comparability, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 459 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
2002).
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ate particular kinds of policies. For example, the whole scholarly field
8
of “optimal tax policy” revolves around the use of SWFs. SWFs are
9
also increasingly used in environmental economics. Much economic
analysis of climate change employs the SWF framework—including
10
both the recent Stern report and competing work (such as well11
known work by William Nordhaus ). Nordhaus and Stern disagree,
12
vigorously, about the choice of discount rate, but concur in looking
at the problem of global warming through the lens of an SWF.
In prior articles and a forthcoming book, I draw upon both the
various bodies of economic scholarship just referenced and contemporary scholarship in moral philosophy, and argue for a prioritarian
SWF: one that has the form

N

 g (u ( x)) .
i 1

13

i

Here, I will very briefly

summarize the main elements of this prioritarian framework. The
reader is referred to the work just cited for a much fuller explication
14
and defense.
The prioritarian framework is, concededly, consequentialist and
welfarist. A policymaker faces some set of possible choices A = {a, b,
c, . . .}. The prioritarian framework tells the decisionmaker to think
about those choices by, first, thinking about the possible outcomes of
the choices and ranking those outcomes. Formally, a given choice
situation is matched with an outcome set O = {x, y, z, . . .}, where each
element of O is a description of a possible way the world might turn
out. The function of the prioritarian SWF is to rank the outcomes in
O and thereby—ultimately—to determine the ranking of the choices
in A.
Because the prioritarian framework is meant to function as a

8 For reviews, see MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION
(1990); Christopher Heady, Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TAX POLICY 23 (Michael P. Devereux ed., 1996); Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Optimal Commodity and Income Taxation: An Introduction, in THE THEORY OF TAXATION FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22 (David Newbery & Nicholas Stern eds., 1987).
9 See Ian W.H. Parry et al., The Incidence of Pollution Control Policies 26–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11438, 2005).
10

NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007).

11

WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE (2008).

12

See NORDHAUS, supra note 11, at 165–91; David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed (Reg-Markets Ctr., Working Paper No. 08-19, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1223448.
13 See sources cited supra note 1. The articles cited there are agnostic as between prioritarianism and other types of equity-regarding SWFs, but my forthcoming book defends prioritarianism.
14

See id.
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workable tool for policy choice—a tool that should be useable by actual human decisionmakers, with “bounded” cognitive abilities—
outcomes are simplified descriptions of ways the world might turn
out, not complete “possible worlds.” An outcome describes what
might occur, with respect to some of the determinants of human wellbeing. For example, each outcome in O might be a different possible
realization of annual consumption amounts for each member of the
population. Or, each might consist of a different possible realization
of annual health states for each member of the population. Or, each
outcome might describe how each individual fares with respect to
both health and consumption, or how she fares with respect to both
consumption and various public goods.
Questions about the appropriate construction and simplification
of outcome sets have great practical relevance, and I do address them
15
at length elsewhere. But they are too complicated to discuss in brief
compass, and are orthogonal to the issues of this Article—and so I ignore them here. For purposes of the analysis that follows, all I need
to assume is that each choice situation is paired with an outcome set
O, containing descriptions of possible ways the world might be. Each
such description—each element of O—may be more or less simplified, but does include information about which individuals exist.
The prioritarian framework is consequentialist because it derives
a ranking of policy choices from a ranking of outcomes. It is welfarist
because it makes the ranking of outcomes solely a function of human
well-being. Some readers will find these features of the framework
attractive. Others will not—whether because they reject consequentialism, or because they accept consequentialism but reject the premise that the ranking of outcomes should be solely a function of human
well-being. Even some of these readers, however, might come to see
the prioritarian framework as a useful approximation, or as one com16
ponent in a broader moral theory.
The prioritarian framework, like other approaches in the SWF
family, presupposes the possibility of interpersonal welfare comparisons. It represents such comparisons via the device of a utility func-

15
16

See ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1.

Theorists who are concerned about equalizing opportunity for well-being, rather than
well-being itself, may see prioritarianism as a rough approximation of the correct moral theory.
Hybrid theorists who believe that morality requires the maximization of good consequences,
within deontological constraints, may see prioritarianism as one component of a broader moral
theory—as may theorists who believe that morality requires attention both to human well-being,
and to other considerations, e.g., animal well-being or intrinsic environmental values. See id.
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tion u(.), which helps to determine the ranking of outcomes. The utility function maps a given outcome, x, onto a vector of individual utilities.
In the core case where the very same N individuals exist in every
outcome in O, u(.) maps x onto the vector (u1(x), u2(x), . . . , uN(x)).
u1(x) is the utility of individual 1 in outcome x, u2(x) the utility of individual 2 in outcome x, and so forth. These utility numbers allow for
interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels; for interpersonal
comparisons of well-being differences; and for comparisons of each
individual’s well-being to a “neutral” level of zero well-being. In
other words, ui(x) > uj(y) iff individual i is better off in outcome x than
individual j is in outcome y. Further, ui ( x)  ui ( y )  u j ( w)  u j ( z )
iff the difference between individual i’s well-being in x and y is
greater than the difference between individual j’s well-being in w and
z. Finally, ui(x) > 0 iff i is better off in x than the neutral level.
But how is it possible to compare welfare levels and differences
across persons; to compare welfare to a zero level; and to construct a
numerical utility function u(.) that faithfully represents these comparisons? Here, I draw upon John Harsanyi’s notion of extended
17
preferences. An extended preference is a preference to be one or
another person. Formally, extended preferences are preferences regarding life histories. A life history takes the form (x; i), which means
being individual i in outcome x. Assume once more the core case of
N individuals who exist in all outcomes in the outcome set O = {x,
y, . . .}, with K outcomes in total. Then there are N x K life histories.
For each of the N individuals, we can ask about her extended preferences over the N x K life histories—not her actual extended preferences but rather, I suggest, her fully informed, fully rational, selfinterested extended preferences. Further, we can ask about her fully
informed, fully rational, self-interested extended preferences regarding different lotteries over the N x K life histories. Finally, we can ask
about her fully informed, fully rational, self-interested extended preferences as between various life histories and the prospect of nonexistence. And we can represent this extended preference structure,
for the given individual, via a utility function—at least if the individual’s fully informed, fully rational, self-interested extended preferences are complete.
17 See JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN
GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 48–83 (1977); John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the
Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING
255, 289–97 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
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Harsanyi makes the further assumption that each of the N individuals will have the very same extended preferences over life histories and lotteries, and that these extended preferences will indeed be
complete. Both assumptions are problematic, in my view, and in my
explication of the prioritarian framework I discuss how they might be
18
relaxed. For purposes of this Article, however, the possibility of incomplete or divergent extended preferences is a complication that can
be ignored. Assume, for simplicity, that the N individuals, if fully informed, fully rational, and self-interested, would have the same, complete ranking of life histories and lotteries over life histories, and
would converge in how they compare each life history to nonexistence. This single, complete extended-preference structure can be
represented by a utility function u(x; i), which will be unique, up to a
19
ratio transformation. Because u(x; i) is unique up to a ratio transformation, it contains sufficient information to make interpersonal
comparisons of both well-being levels and differences, and to allow us
to say whether a given life history is above or below the zero level.
In short, we need an interpersonally comparable utility function
for our SWF, u(.), which will map each outcome onto a vector
(u1(x), u2(x), . . . , uN(x)); and we can produce that function by defining
ui(x) = u(x; i), the utility of having the life history of person i in outcome x.
Generically, a SWF takes the form w(x) = w(u1(x), u2(x), . . . ,
uN(x)). It attaches a social value to each outcome w(x), as a function
of the individual utilities in that outcome (u1(x), u2(x), . . . , uN(x)).
This SWF value, w(x), is meant to represent the ranking of the out20
comes. w(x)  w(y) iff x is at least as good an outcome as y.
Prioritarianism uses a particular functional form for w(x), namely
N

w(x) =

 g (u ( x)) .
i 1

i

Why adopt this particular formula for ranking

outcomes?
Philosophers who have explicated prioritarianism agree that its
distinctive feature is this: while utilitarianism simply adds up individual utilities, prioritarianism gives extra moral weight to well-being
changes affecting individuals at lower well-being levels. Those who

18 See ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1; see also MATTHEW D. ADLER
& ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 47–50 (2006).
19 This means that v(.) produces the very same ranking of life histories, lotteries over life
histories, and comparisons of each life history to nonexistence as u(.) iff v(.) = ku(.), where k is a
positive constant.
20

“At least as good as” means either better than or equally good as.
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have discussed how to represent prioritarianism through the SWF
formalism also agree that the form

N

 g (u ( x))
i

i 1

21

is the way to do so.

The strict increasingness and concavity of g(.) has precisely the implication that the change in the value of the SWF, produced by a given
change in an individual’s utility, decreases as the individual’s utility
level increases. Consider that, if individual i is at utility level ui(x) in
22
outcome x, the change in the value of the SWF produced by increasing i’s utility by a positive amount u is g(ui(x) + u) – g(ui(x)). Consider now the change in the value of the SWF produced by increasing
individual j’s utility by the same u amount, where j is worse off than
i: uj(x) < ui(x). Because g is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
23
this change will be greater in j’s case than in i’s.

21 See Karsten Klint Jensen, What Is the Difference between (Moderate) Egalitarianism
and Prioritarianism?, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 89, 99 (2003); John Broome, Equality Versus Priority: A
Useful Distinction, in FAIRNESS AND GOODNESS IN HEALTH (Daniel Wikler et al. eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with author); Nils Holtug, Prioritarianism, in
EGALITARIANISM: NEW ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF EQUALITY 125, 133 (Nils
Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen eds., 2007); Wlodek Rabinowicz, Prioritarianism and Uncertainty: On the Interpersonal Addition Theorem and the Priority View, in EXPLORING
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM ACTION TO VALUES 139, 148 (Dan Egonsson et al. eds., 2001);
Campbell Brown, Matters of Priority 99–105 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Australian National University) (on file with author).
22

“The value of the SWF” means w(x) =

N

 g (u ( x))
i 1

23

See Brown, supra note 21 at 117–18.

i

.
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Chart 1. Transforming Utility with a Strictly Increasing and Concave
g-Function.

g(u(x))

u(x)
uj(x)

uj(x)+∆u

ui(x)

ui(x)+∆u

The question remains, however: why do well-being changes affecting individuals at lower well-being levels have greater moral
weight? Here I offer the following picture, building on work by
24
Thomas Nagel. Given two outcomes x and y, the moral ranking of x
and y should be a function of individuals’ claims in favor of x or y.
“Claims,” in this picture, are relations between an individual and a
pair of outcomes. As between outcomes x and y, a given individual
has a claim in favor of x over y, a claim in favor of y over x, or no
claim either way.
What leads to prioritarianism are the following substantive
propositions concerning claims. If individual i is equally well off in x
and y, then she has no claim either way. If i is better off in x than y,
then she has a claim in favor of x over y. Further, in the case where
an individual is better off in one outcome than another, the strength of

24 See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 63–74 (1991) (presenting a conception of equality that sees each individual as having a distinct claim to well-being, and that gives
priority to worse-off individuals); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 106–27 (1979) (same).
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her claim for the first outcome depends both on her well-being difference between the two outcomes, and on her well-being levels in the
two outcomes. The strength of the claim varies directly with the well25
being difference and inversely with the levels. In particular, consider the case where i is better off in x than y, and j is better off in y
26
than x; the well-being differences are the same; but j is worse off in
27
both outcomes than i is in both outcomes. In this case (at least if j is
not responsible for being worse off than i in both outcomes), it is only
fair that we count j as having a stronger claim between the outcomes
28
than i.
This approach to ranking pairs of outcomes—as a function of individuals’ claims in favor of one outcome or the other, with worse-off
individuals having stronger claims—leads us to the prioritarian SWF.
I should also note that it helps resolve a different question: namely,
whether the ranking of outcomes should be a function of individuals’
lifetime well-being in the outcomes, or instead a function of individuals’ well-being during “sublifetime” periods (e.g., annual well-being).
I adopt the lifetime approach. ui(x) is a utility number representing
i’s lifetime well-being in outcome x. The SWF formula that I defend,
N

 g (u ( x)) , means the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave
i

i 1

transformation of individuals’ lifetime utilities. This approach is justified by the fact that human personhood (normally) endures over an
entire lifetime. Each human being (normally) remains one and the
same person from the time she is born until the end of her human life.
The deep rationale for ranking pairs of outcomes by considering individuals’ claims for or against the outcomes is that each individual is
distinct from every other—a different particular person, with a distinct moral “vote” to determine how the world should be shaped.
And, because personhood endures over a human lifetime, the “currency” for individuals’ claims should be lifetime rather than sublifetime well-being.
N

The prioritarian SWF,

 g (u ( x)) , satisfies a number of axioms.
i 1

i

25 Of course, the individual is at different levels in the two outcomes, so to be more precise, we should say that the strength of the claim is a decreasing function of the average wellbeing level.
26

That is, ui(x) – ui(y) = uj(y) – uj(x).

27

That is, ui(x) > ui(y) > uj(y) > uj(x).

28

Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell use the term “fairness” to mean non-welfarism. See
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 38–45 (2002). However, if
one views fairness (as I do) as a matter of the equitable satisfaction of individuals’ claims to
well-being, there is no inconsistency between fairness and welfarism.

1488

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 77:1478

All of these axioms can be given a strong substantive justification in
the theory of prioritarianism (at least in the claim-based version as I
have just summarized it).
Pareto Indifference: If each individual is just as well off in
outcome x as she is in y, then the two outcomes should be
ranked by the SWF as equally good.
Anonymity: If the utility levels in x are just a rearrangement
(“permutation”) of the utility levels in y, x and y should be
29
ranked as equally good.
Pareto Superiority: If each individual is at least as well off in x
as in y, and one or more individuals are strictly better off in x,
then x should be ranked as better than y.
Pigou-Dalton: If i is better off than j in some outcome, and
we transfer a fixed amount of utility from i to j, leaving everyone else unaffected, and leaving j still worse off than i, the
new outcome should be ranked as better than the original
one.
Separability-Across-Individuals: If some individuals are just
as well off in x and y, the ranking of x and y does not depend
on what particular level of well-being each individual attains
in the two outcomes.
Even if we accept the basic argument for a prioritarian SWF,
more room for discussion remains. After all, there are many different
kinds of strictly increasing and strictly concave g-functions. I believe
that the “Atkinsonian” class of SWFs—a subfamily within the
broader prioritarian family—provides the most attractive basis for
ranking outcomes.
The Atkinsonian SWFs have the form

1
1 

N

 u ( x)
i 1

1

i

.

They are parameterized by a single inequality-

aversion parameter , which ranges from 0 to infinity. The larger the
value of , the greater the weight given to welfare changes affecting
worse-off individuals. With  = 0, the SWF is no longer prioritarian
and becomes utilitarian. As  approaches infinity, the SWF ap30
proaches the “leximin” SWF.
29 In the case of infinite populations, we need to distinguish between different variants of
the anonymity axiom. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. But in the finite case, anonymity is straightforward: utility vectors with the same, finite number of entries that are permutations of each other must be ranked as equally good.
30 Leximin says to rank two outcomes equally if the utility vectors corresponding to the
two are permutations of each other. Otherwise, x is better than y if the worst-off individual in x
is better off than the worst-off individual in y; if their well-being levels are equal, then x is better
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Atkinsonian SWFs are already widely used in SWF scholarship.
31
They are attractive for measure-theoretic reasons and because of
their simplicity. They also correspond to the well-known Atkinsonian
index of inequality, which is one of the most widely used such indices.
To this point, I have focused on the problem of ranking outcomes. But the SWF framework will not be useful, as a guide to policy choice, unless it ultimately helps to rank choices. In the case
where the decisionmaker is operating under complete certainty, this is
straightforward: she should make the choice with the best outcome in
O. In the more realistic case where the decisionmaker is operating
under uncertainty, deriving a ranking of choices from the ranking of
outcomes becomes trickier.
I argue that the prioritarian framework should use expected utility
theory to derive a ranking of choices from the ranking of outcomes.
A given choice a should be assigned an expected utility term
EU(a) =



a

xO

( x) w( x) —where a(x) is the probability that action a

yields outcome x, and w(x) is the social value assigned x, i.e.,

1
1 

N

 u ( x)
i 1

1

i

. This approach, however, is controversial. Although

some scholars within the SWF tradition agree that the ranking of actions should be a function of both the possible outcomes of choice
and their probabilities, integrated as per the EU formula just pro32
33
vided, others argue for a different approach.
than y if the 2nd-worst-off individual in x is better off than the 2nd-worst-off individual in y; and
if their well-being levels are equal, then x is better than y if the 3rd-worst-off individual in x is
better off than the 3rd-worst-off individual in y; and so forth.
31 These are the only prioritarian SWFs which are invariant to multiplication of individual
utilities by a common positive constant. More precisely, Atkinsonian SWFs are thus invariant if
all utilities are nonnegative. No prioritarian SWF is invariant to multiplication of utilities by a
common positive constant once negative individual utilities are allowed into the domain of utility vectors. And, quite apart from the invariance issue, the Atkinsonian SWF is not suitable for
use with negative utilities because—with negative utilities—the function g (u ( x))  ( 1 )u1
i
i

1 

is either undefined or, if defined, not both strictly increasing and strictly concave. See Adler,
Risk Equity, supra note 1, at 41 n.122.
32 See, e.g., Peter J. Hammond, Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 85, 90–96 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1994); Rabinowicz, supra note 21; Marc Fleurbaey, Assessing Risky Social Situations (Society for Social
Choice and Welfare, Working Paper, Feb. 2008), http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/SCW2008/
SCW2008-08-00028S.pdf.
33 See, e.g., Elchanan Ben-Porath et al., On the Measurement of Inequality under Uncertainty, 75 J. ECON. THEORY 194 (1997); Peter A. Diamond, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic
Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Comment, 75 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1967); Larry
G. Epstein & Uzi Segal, Quadratic Social Welfare Functions, 100 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1992). The
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For purposes of this Article, I can ignore this dispute. The problem of future generations, to which we now turn, concerns the outcome ranking. How shall we shall take account of future people, possibly nonexistent people, variations in population size, and infinite
futures in ranking the outcome set O = {x, y, . . .}?
II. The Core Case: A Fixed Population and a Finite Future
There is a substantial body of scholarship in economics that employs some kind of SWF to evaluate policies with intertemporal impacts. Within this body of scholarship, a discount factor is often applied to individual utilities, with the amount of the discount increasing
34
as utilities occur further in the future.
35
Is this appropriate? To begin, we should distinguish between
the propriety of discounting within cost-benefit analysis (where a discount factor is often applied to willingness to pay/accept amounts),
and the propriety of discounting within the SWF framework. The two
cases raise somewhat different issues, and I will not discuss cost36
benefit analysis here. My focus is on SWFs—specifically, on prioritarian SWFs.
We should also distinguish between intrapersonal and interper37
sonal discounting. The SWF framework begins with a utility func38
tion, which represents the (complete and convergent ) extended
preferences of fully informed, fully rational, self-interested individuals
contemplating the prospect of living different life histories. That
dispute about the appropriate application of a social welfare function under conditions of uncertainty is fully reviewed in ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1.
34 See, e.g., CHARLES BLACKORBY ET AL., POPULATION ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY, WELFARE ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS 253–71 (2005); John Creedy & Ross Guest, Discounting and the Time Preference Rate, 84 ECON. REC. 109 (2008); Geoffrey Heal, Discounting:
A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007).
35 There is a vast literature about discounting. See, e.g., Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note
12, at 3 n.7.
36 For a discussion of discounting and cost-benefit analysis, see ADLER & POSNER, supra
note 18, at 173–77. One argument for discounting in the context of cost-benefit analysis—that it
is a way to compensate for the fact that future generations will be richer and have a lower marginal utility of consumption—is unavailing in the SWF context, because the marginal utility of
consumption is already reflected in the utility function u(x). See infra text accompanying notes
46–48.
37

Ricky Revesz draws a similar distinction. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 948
(1999) (arguing that “discounting raises analytically distinct issues in the cases of latent harms
and harms to future generations”).
38 As already explained, I am assuming the completeness and convergence of extended
preferences in this Article to simplify the analysis. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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function will assign each outcome x a lifetime utility number
ui(x) = u(x; i), representing the lifetime well-being associated with individual i’s life history in outcome x. What u(x; i) is will depend on
how outcomes are specified (whether in terms of health, consumption, public goods, happiness, other well-being items, or some combination), and on which of the specified characteristics individual i possesses, at various points in his life, in outcome x.
A discount factor may come into play at this level: at the level of
mapping an individual’s characteristics in an outcome onto her lifetime utility. For example, imagine that outcomes characterize individuals’ life spans and annual consumption for each year alive. So life
history (x; i) = (cbi ( x;i ) , cbi ( x ;i ) 1 ,..., cbi ( x ;i )  l ( x;i ) 1 ) —where cti is the con39

sumption of individual i in year t in outcome x; b(x; i) is the year that
individual i is born in outcome x; and l(x; i) is the number of years
that individual i is alive in outcome x. Further, let us make the standard assumption that we can assign a “subutility” to an individual’s
consumption in each time period (here, each year)—for example,
v(cti )  log cti —and that the lifetime utility of a consumption sequence
is an additive function of the subutilities.
One possibility is that the additive function is the straight, undiscounted sum of consumption subutility each year. In other words,
u ( x; i ) 

b ( x ;i )  l ( x ;i ) 1



t  b ( x ;i )

v(cti ) . Another possibility is that this additive func-

tion incorporates a discount factor, so that consumption events that
occur earlier in time are given greater weight in determining lifetime
utility. In other words, u ( x; i ) 

b ( x ;i )  l ( x ;i ) 1



t  b ( x ;i )

G (t )v(cti ) —where G(t) is a

discount factor that decreases as t increases. This latter formula
would be an example of what I am calling “intrapersonal discounting.” It incorporates a discount factor in generating a lifetime utility
number for a given life history from the individual’s characteristics in
each period (in this example, the individual’s annual consumption
amounts, as measured by an annual subutility number v(cti ) ).
The propriety of intrapersonal discounting raises difficult issues
about the nature of well-being that I will not attempt to grapple with
40
here. The traditional philosophical wisdom is that it is irrational to
care whether pains and pleasures, consumption events, and other con39

This could be a vector of consumptions of different goods or a single consumption

amount.
40

See ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1.
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stituents of well-being occur earlier or later in time. Derek Parfit has
41
challenged this traditional view. Assuming it is rationally permissible to care about the temporal position of well-being constituents, it
becomes an empirical question (within my framework for assigning
utilities) whether fully informed, fully rational, self-interested individuals actually do have this sort of preference.
The sort of discounting that I will challenge in this Article is interpersonal discounting: discounting lifetime utilities. This sort of discounting occurs after each outcome has been mapped onto a vector of
lifetime utilities, representing the lifetime well-being of each individual in the outcome.
Consider, specifically, the “core case” in which the same N individuals exist in all outcomes. By “exist,” I mean that the individual is
a member of the current generation or a past or future generation.
She lives now, was alive in the past, or will be alive in the future. In
other words, N is the number of the world’s intertemporal population,
which in the core case is assumed to be fixed.
The prioritarian SWF without interpersonal discounting assigns
N

each outcome a social welfare value w(x) equaling

 g (u ( x)) .
i 1

i

In the

core case, I believe, this simple, undiscounted formula is most defensible. By contrast, the prioritarian SWF with interpersonal discountN

ing takes the form

 D(b( x; i)) g (u ( x)) —where b(x; i) is the date at
i

i 1

which individual i is born in outcome x, and D(t) is a discount factor
42
which is a decreasing function of time t. The upshot of incorporating
this interpersonal discount factor into the prioritarian formula is to
give less weight, in the social calculus, to the lifetime utilities of future
generations as opposed to the current generation—and less weight to
the lifetime utilities of individuals who live in the distant rather than
near future.
What is wrong with interpersonal discounting? A very basic
question, here, concerns the function of the SWF framework. The
41

See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 117–95 (1984).

42

For a full discussion of formulas for social choice that take account of individuals’ lifetime utility, birth dates, and length of life, see BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 34, at 253–71.
A variation on this formula puts the discount rate inside rather than outside the gN

function, i.e.,

 g ( D(b( x; i))u ( x)) .
i 1

i

Other variations make the discount factor a function of

some date other than the individual’s birth date, e.g., his death date, or the date midway between birth and death. My arguments against interpersonal discounting apply to all these variations.
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framework might be seen as, fundamentally, descriptive: a way to describe society’s actual policy preferences. On this view, it is the nodiscounting approach which is problematic, because governments in
practice are far from neutral between the interests of their current
citizens and the interests of future generations.
Whatever their potential descriptive role, SWFs are also a useful
prescriptive tool. In particular, I defend the SWF framework as a useful tool for moral deliberation. It usefully systematizes moral deliberation of a certain sort, namely moral deliberation that starts with
welfarism and consequentialism as basic premises. My interest,
throughout this Article, is in the appropriate structure of SWFs where
used as tools for moral deliberation. And my claim in this Part is that
interpersonal discounting is inappropriate in that context.
Why? Moral deliberation is impartial. Interpersonal discounting
violates this impartiality. It gives less weight to the interests of certain
individuals, by virtue of a characteristic that is very hard to see as having moral relevance—namely, being born later rather than earlier in
the history of the world.
Indeed, given welfarism, we can sharpen the critique of interpersonal discounting. Interpersonal discounting violates welfarism. Welfarism says that the ranking of outcomes should be solely a function
of individual well-being—with no attention to non-well-being characteristics of individuals.
Welfarism can be formally expressed, in part, through the anonymity axiom. If the (N-entry) vector of individuals’ lifetime utilities
in x is just a permutation of the vector of individuals’ lifetime utilities
in y, x and y should be ranked as equally good. Interpersonal discounting violates the anonymity axiom, by making the ranking of outcomes a function both of individual well-being, and of the point in
time when individuals are born. For a simple example, consider a
case where N = 2. One individual is born earlier, the other later. In
outcome x, the earlier-born individual has lifetime well-being 50 and
the later-born individual has lifetime well-being 100. In outcome y,
these well-being numbers are switched: the earlier-born individual has
lifetime well-being 100 and the later-born individual has lifetime wellbeing 50. Interpersonal discounting means that y is ranked higher
than x, which violates anonymity.
It might be objected that anonymity is too demanding a statement of welfarism. I do not see why it is—it seems to capture the basic idea that well-being, and nothing else, should drive the ranking of
outcomes—but in any event interpersonal discounting also violates a
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different principle that is generally accepted as the very core of welfarism: the Pareto-indifference principle. Pareto indifference says that
if each individual is just as well off in outcome x as in outcome y, the
two outcomes are equally good. But interpersonal discounting can
43
violate Pareto indifference. Imagine that each of the N individuals
achieves the very same level of lifetime utility in x as he does in y.
However, one individual, Jim, has a different birth date in x than in y.
(The objection that this is impossible—that a person’s birth date is an
essential characteristic of him—fails. For example, if Jim develops
from a union of a particular sperm and egg, then he remains the same
particular person whether he is born by natural childbirth, or cryogenically frozen as a fertilized ovum by his parents and born 60 years
44
later. ) In such a case, using an SWF with interpersonal discounting
will rank x above y or vice versa, but Pareto indifference requires that
they be ranked as equally good.
If you like, the argument against interpersonal discounting can be
framed in terms of prioritarianism specifically, rather than welfarism
generally. Prioritarianism (as I explicate it) sees the ranking of outcomes as emerging from individuals’ claims. Consider two individuals, one of whom is better off in x, the other better off in y. The individuals are born on different dates. It is fair (at least plausibly) that
the later-born individual should have a weaker claim between the
outcomes if she is at a higher lifetime well-being level in both outcomes than the earlier-born individual. It is also fair (at least plausibly) that the later-born individual should have a weaker claim between the outcomes if her well-being difference between them is less
than the earlier-born individual’s. But to count the later-born individual as having a weaker claim merely because she is born at a later
date is very hard to see as fair. What justifies this deflation of her
claim?
In short: the impartial nature of moral deliberation generally, the
axioms of welfarism more specifically, and the concern for a fair aggregation of individual claims characteristic of prioritarianism yet
more specifically, all cut against interpersonal discounting. In response, it might be argued that this analysis implicitly assumes moral
deliberation to adopt an impartial stance vis-à-vis the world’s in43 See Tyler Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of Intergenerational Discount,
in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 162 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin
eds., 1992); JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING LIVES 127 (2004); BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 34, at
253–59.
44

See Cowen, supra note 43, at 164.
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tertemporal population. Why can we not engage in a kind of moral
deliberation—if you like, call it “shmoral” deliberation—which focuses on the well-being of a subset of the world’s intertemporal population?
Whether we call it “moral” or “shmoral,” deliberation that strives
to be impartial vis-à-vis some proper subset of the world’s intertemporal population—for example, all persons currently existing, or all
U.S. citizens, past, present, or future—is certainly a possible enterprise. It is also certainly possible to structure this kind of deliberation
using a prioritarian SWF. But the upshot would be an SWF that gives
zero weight to the lifetime utilities of individuals outside the commu45
nity of interest—not one that incorporates a discount factor.
46
What about various standard arguments for discounting? One
such argument appeals to economic growth and the declining marginal utility of consumption. Future generations will be at higher consumption levels; increments in their consumption will make a smaller
difference to their well-being than increments in the consumption of
the current generation; and policy analysis should incorporate a discount factor to reflect that.
Another standard argument appeals to opportunity costs. Given
intertemporal financial markets, current resources can be invested at
some positive interest rate, yielding more resources in the future.
Imagine that the available annual rate is r. Imagine, now, that we are
considering a regulatory policy that will impose a current reduction in
consumption, c, with consumption benefits in twenty years, for the
next generation, equaling b > c. Imagine, further, that the increase
in the lifetime utility of the future individuals benefited by the policy
is greater than the decrease in the lifetime utility of the current individuals who are made worse off by the policy. If so, a prioritarian
SWF without interpersonal discounting might well approve the pol47
icy. But the policy may well be a bad idea. In particular, imagine
20
that c(1+r) > b. In that case, we could produce greater consumption and, therewith, utility for the future generation, with the very

45 To be sure, the deliberator who wanted to be impartial vis-à-vis some proper subset of
the world’s population would presumably want to be sensitive to the fact that harms and benefits to persons outside the community of interest might, in turn, affect the well-being of individuals inside the community of interest—for example, because these insiders care about the
outsiders. However, such impacts would show up in the utility function of the insiders.
46
47

See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 18, at 173–77.

Whether the prioritarian SWF would, in fact, approve the policy would depend on the
utility levels of the future and present individuals.
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same consumption and utility cost for the present generation, by investing the resources in the market at interest rate r.
A final argument appeals to uncertainty. In general, we are less
certain about what the impact of a policy will be on unborn individuals than on the current generation.
These three standard arguments all make vital points, but none
justify interpersonal discounting. A prioritarian SWF with the undiscounted form

N

 g (u ( x))
i 1

i

is already fully sensitive to considerations of

economic growth/declining marginal utility, opportunity costs, and
uncertainty.
The first point is handled by the mapping from the outcome ranking to the choice ranking, and by the individual utility function u(.).
If, given one or another choice in the choice set, it is likely that future
generations will be richer (at a higher consumption level) than the
current generation, then this just means that the subset of outcomes
in which future generations are richer than the current generation will
48
be assigned a high probability (conditional on that choice), and that
the subset of outcomes in which future generations are poorer than
the current generation will be assigned a low probability (conditional
on that choice). And if consumption does indeed have declining marginal utility, that will be reflected in the function u(.) that maps outcomes (characterized in part in terms of individual consumption) onto
individual lifetime utility.
Opportunity costs are most straightforwardly handled within the
SWF framework by representing the option of investing current resources as an additional policy choice. Where intertemporal markets
exist, the choice set considered by policy analysts should not merely
include {sq, a, b, . . .}, that is, the status quo option of inaction and
48 I assume here that the ranking of actions in the choice set A is a function of probability
numbers expressing the probability that a given action a in this set would yield a given outcome
x in the outcome set O—probability numbers of the form  a ( x) —as well as the utility function
N

u(.) that maps each outcome onto a utility vector, and the SWF

 g (u ( x))
i 1

ranking of those vectors. The probability term

 a ( x)

i

that produces a

is what I am calling, roughly, the prob-

ability of an outcome “conditional” on a choice. Whether

 a ( x)

is, strictly, a conditional prob-

ability implicates the debate between so-called “causal” and “evidential” decision theory, which
I need not further discuss here. See ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1. Further,
my assumption that the ranking of actions in the choice set is a function of the  a ( x) values,
the utility function, and the SWF is more generic than the specific claim that this information is
integrated via the EU formula—an issue I leave open in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33.
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various regulatory policies, but also {sq, a, b, . . . , inv}, where inv is
the option of investing resources in intertemporal markets at a positive interest rate.
Finally, and in line with decision theory more generally, the SWF
framework straightforwardly handles uncertainty at the level of mapping actions to outcomes. Uncertainty is a feature of a particular decisionmaker, poised to choose from some choice set. It shows up in
her probability distribution, conditional on each choice in that set,
49
over the outcome set. Uncertainty should not (and need not) be
handled by distorting the outcome ranking itself, for example by incorporating an interpersonal discount factor into the formula used to
50
produce the ranking.
Let me conclude by returning to the point that an SWF without
interpersonal discounting might argue for policies that are dramatically different from current policies. This point might be framed, not
as a challenge to the no-discounting approach understood as a purported description of actual practice—again, my interests are prescriptive, not descriptive—but indeed as a challenge to the prescriptive credentials of the no-discounting approach.
The point might be articulated as follows. “No-interpersonaldiscounting requires policies that are very different from our current
policies. Further, it is counterintuitive that the current generation
should pursue these new policies. Moral deliberation is a matter of
striving for reflective equilibrium, by giving weight both to general
principles and to intuitions about particular cases. No-interpersonaldiscounting, in requiring a radical revision of current policies, is morally problematic because it fails the test of reflective equilibrium.”

49

See supra note 48.

50

One variation on the uncertainty argument for discounting points to an extinction risk.
See STERN, supra note 10, at 50–54; Antoine Bommier & Stephane Zuber, Can Preferences for
Catastrophe Avoidance Reconcile Social Discounting with Intergenerational Equity?, 31 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 415 (2008); Partha Dasgupta, Discounting Climate Change, 37 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 141, 160 (2008). This argument moves outside the core case. Instead, the date
after which individuals no longer exist, and the number of individuals who exist, can vary across
outcomes.
If the existence of a given generation is likelier than succeeding generations, and less
likely than preceding generations, then an argument for ranking outcomes with a discount factor
to reflect this extinction risk arises. However, a more transparent and flexible approach to taking account of extinction risk would seem to be ranking outcomes without a discount factor, and
incorporating the risk into the representation of each action as a probability distribution across
outcomes. The flexibility of this approach would be particularly advantageous, it would seem, if
we wish to allow the extinction risk to vary depending on which policy is undertaken (e.g.,
whether or not we take steps to mitigate a catastrophic event), rather than being exogenous.
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In general, the fact that a moral theory requires a radical revision
of current policies does not entail that the theory is counterintuitive in
the reflective equilibrium sense—even to those engaging in the poli51
cies. However, no-interpersonal-discounting has a potential result
that is both revisionary and morally counterintuitive.
The worry, specifically, is that a no-interpersonal-discounting approach, together with a positive interest rate in intertemporal markets, might require the current generation to impoverish itself for the
52
future. To see this worry in a highly simplified case, imagine that:
the world has two periods; individuals live for a single period; there
are an equal number of individuals who are alive in each period; and
an individual’s lifetime well-being is just a linear function of his consumption during the one period he is alive, i.e., ui(x) = v(ci) = kci,
where ci is the amount that i consumes in outcome x during the period
he is alive. Consumption comes from a store of collective resources.
53
Individuals who consume nothing have utility zero. The leaders of
the earlier generation must decide whether to allow that generation
to consume all of the resources, or invest some fraction at an interest
rate r > 0, for consumption by the later generation. If the leaders
make this decision by employing a utilitarian SWF with no interpersonal discounting, they reach the morally counterintuitive conclusion
that they should invest the entire stock of resources, leaving none for
the current generation.
This conclusion is counterintuitive, but it can be avoided by revising features of the SWF framework other than no-discounting—
which, as argued, is a feature we should be particularly unwilling to
relinquish in reflective equilibrium, because it is tied to impartiality.
First, using a utility function v(ci), which is not a linear function of
consumption, but rather has the plausible property that the marginal
utility of consumption declines as consumption increases, will reduce
the amount of resources that the earlier generation is required to invest for the future.
Second, and independently, shifting from utilitarianism to prioritarianism helps to avoid the counterintuitive conclusion. Consider

51

There certainly can be societies that are immoral in some fundamental sense, e.g., racist, and are also seen by some of the members of these societies to be immoral.
52 See Geoffrey Brennan, Discounting the Future, Yet Again, 6 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 259,
268 (2007).
53 This premise is to simplify the analysis, and might mean that without consumption individuals die prematurely and end up with a life no better than nonexistence; or that they subsist
but end up with a life no better than nonexistence.
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N

 u ( x)

1

i 1

i
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. Assume, for simplicity, that

v(ci) = kci. As already mentioned, with  = 0, the SWF is utilitarian.
54
As  increases, the SWF becomes increasingly inequality-averse and,
55
at the limit, approaches leximin. Note now that if  is greater than
zero, the current generation will never be required to give all of the
resources for the future. (Intuitively, by investing a given increment
of the resources, the current generation produces a greater well-being
change for the future generation than if it had consumed the increment; but the current generation also lowers its well-being level,
thereby giving itself a stronger claim to the next increment.) Further,
the greater the value of , the less the current generation is required
to invest. Finally, at the limit, with a leximin social ordering, the current generation is required to invest only so much as to produce the
56
very same consumption amounts for both generations.
In short, cases in which a no-interpersonal-discounting rule plus a
positive interest rate lead to a certain degree of well-being disparity
54 Take any two individuals, one better off, one worse off. Consider the ratio between
the change in the value of the SWF produced by giving a small increment of utility to the worseoff individual, and the change produced by giving a small increment to the better-off individual.
That ratio increases without limit as  increases.
55

See ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1; Adler, Risk Equity, supra note 1,

at 40–45.
56 To show this formally, let us denote by S the stock of resources held by the current
generation, and N the number of individuals in each generation. The leader of the current generation chooses some amount c for the first-generation individuals to consume. With an interest
rate of r, this yields (S-c)(1+r) for the future generation. If the leader makes this decision using
the Atkinsonian SWF, without discounting the future generation’s utility, she chooses c so as to

maximize

1
1 
( N (c N )  N [( S  c)(1  r ) / N ]1 ) . (To see why this is the correct formula,
1 

note that, if a given amount of total consumption is allocated to some generation, the SWF is
maximized by spreading it evenly among the members of that generation.) This formula is
maximized where c has the value

S

. The derivative of this expression with respect

1

(1  r )



1

to , the Atkinsonian inequality-aversion parameter, is positive—which means that as  increases, optimal first-generation consumption increases (and second-generation consumption
decreases). In other words, by increasing the degree of inequality-aversion, the degree to which
the first generation is required to impoverish itself for the second decreases. Note also that, as 
approaches zero, so that the SWF becomes utilitarian, the optimal value of c approaches zero.
Conversely, as  approaches infinity, so that the SWF becomes a leximin SWF (giving absolute
priority to the worst-off individual), the optimal value of c approaches

S (1  r ) .
2r

At this value

of c, the amount consumed by the second generation is (S-c)(1+r), which equals S (1  r ) —

2r

confirming that, as the SWF approaches leximin, the two generations approach a point at which
they consume equal amounts.
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between earlier and later generations should be seen as cases that
help us calibrate the degree of inequality aversion of our SWF. These
cases—like synchronic examples in which some individuals are made
worse off than others for the sake of an increase in overall welfare—
help us to determine, as a matter of moral deliberation, how much we
morally value overall welfare versus welfare equality. They help us to
reach a point of reflective equilibrium on the spectrum between utilitarianism and leximin. They need not and should not prompt us to
take the radical step of departing from welfarism and moral impartiality by adopting interpersonal discounting.
III. Beyond the Core Case: Non-Identity, Variable Population, and
Infinity
In the core case of a fixed and finite population, the treatment of
future generations is straightforward—or so I have just argued. Use
N

the simple prioritarian formula  g (ui ( x)) —without a discount factor
i 1

attached to individuals’ lifetime utilities, to rank outcomes.
When we depart from the core case, matters become murkier.
A. Non-Identity
A large literature in moral philosophy addresses “non-identity”
cases: where some action causes the very existence of some individual
who would otherwise not exist, rather than merely harming or bene57
fiting some individual who exists independent of the action. Gregory Kavka nicely summarizes the problem, focusing particularly on
the implications for future generations.
I have heard a rumor, from a reliable source, that I was conceived in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Had my father been
on duty at Camp Kilmer that fateful weekend, or had there
been an earthquake in central New Jersey at the wrong moment, or had any of innumerable other possible events oc57 See, e.g., JOHN BROOME, The Value of a Person, in ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS 228
(1999) [hereinafter BROOME, Value]; BROOME, supra note 43; DAVID HEYD, GENETHICS
(1992); PARFIT, supra note 41, at 351–79; MELINDA A. ROBERTS, CHILD VERSUS CHILDMAKER
(1998); Krister Bykvist, The Benefits of Coming into Existence, 135 PHIL. STUD. 335 (2007);
Caspar Hare, Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not,
and Will Never, Exist?, 117 ETHICS 498 (2007); Nils Holtug, On the Value of Coming into Existence, 5 J. ETHICS 361 (2001); Gregory S. Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 93, 93–94 (1981); Jan Narverson, Utilitarianism and New Generations, 76 MIND 62
(1967); Josh Parsons, Axiological Actualism, 80 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 137 (2002); James
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986).
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curred, the particular sperm and egg cells from which I developed would never have joined, and I would never have existed. This observation about the precariousness of my origin
reflects a basic fact about identity and existence that seriously
complicates attempts to understand our moral relationship to
future generations. Which particular future people will exist
is highly dependent upon the conditions under which we and
our descendants procreate, with the slightest difference in the
conditions of conception being sufficient, in a particular case,
to insure the creation of a different future person.
This fact forms the basis of a surprising argument . . . to the
effect that we have no moral obligation to future generations—beyond, at most, the next few—to promote their wellbeing. . . . Let us assume that sameness of genetic structure
is, for practical purposes, a necessary condition of personal
identity. . . . As a result, any proposed policy that would directly or indirectly affect conditions for conception (that is,
who mates with whom, and when) on a worldwide scale over
a significant period of time would result in an entirely different set of human individuals coming into existence than otherwise would. Now suppose, as seems reasonable, that the
various broad-ranging policies designed to promote better
living conditions for future generations . . . would, if practiced, affect conditions for conception worldwide. Further,
let us allow that if we do not practice these policies, future
people will not be so badly off that it would have been better
for them never to have existed.
Granted these assumptions, are we obligated to practice controlled growth policies in order to bring about better living
conditions for future people? No, for we harm no one if we
allow an alternative policy, call it laissez faire. Consider the
individuals in the overcrowded world that would result from
laissez faire. They are not worse off than if we had acted to
bring about the less crowded state of the world, for in that
case they would not have existed. And, by hypothesis, their
existence is not worse than never having existed. But these
people are all the people there are, if we practice laissez faire.
Thus, in doing so, we make no one worse off (than he otherwise would be) and hence do nothing wrong. We are therefore under no moral obligation to future people to pursue
controlled growth policies in order to promote their well-
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58

being.

Much of the literature has discussed non-identity problems from
a nonconsequentialist perspective. My focus, here, is on its implications for consequentialism, specifically prioritarianism.
The non-identity problem arises, within prioritarianism, where an
outcome set O is such that there are some individuals who exist in
some but not all outcomes in the outcome set. For short, let us call
these individuals “potential nonexistents.”
Note that an outcome set with varying numbers of individuals existing in different outcomes necessarily contains potential nonexistents. However, an outcome set with the same number of individuals
in every outcome may also contain potential nonexistents. Let us use
N(x) to mean the number of individuals who exist in outcome x. It is
possible that N(x) = N(y), and yet that that some individuals exist in x
59
but not y and vice versa.
It also bears note that potential nonexistents may not be potential
future individuals. Outcomes are simplified descriptions of reality—
past, present, and future. It is possible for a decisionmaker at some
time T to be using an outcome set that includes outcomes x and y,
where some individual i is born in x and dies in x at some time prior
to T, and never exists in y. Individual i would be a potential past individual who exists in x but not y.
It is certainly true that decisionmakers often have the causal
power to bring some potential future individuals into existence, but
never have the causal power to bring past or present individuals into
existence (because causation runs forward). If, in addition, the decisionmaker knows for certain which individuals are alive at the time of
her decision or were alive at some point in the past, then she can narrow down her outcome set to include only outcomes that specify the
existence of these individuals. For any pair of outcomes, x, y, in this
restricted outcome set, potential nonexistents will be potential future
individuals. In this setup, the non-identity problem is, strictly, a problem of “future generations.”
However, the difficulty that potential nonexistents pose for the
ranking of outcomes, and possible resolutions of that difficulty, do not
hinge on whether those potential individuals are born (in outcomes

58
59

Kavka, supra note 57, at 93–94 (citations omitted).

See PARFIT, supra note 41, at 355–56 (distinguishing between “Same People Choices”
and “Different People Choices” and, within the latter category, between “Same Number
Choices” and “Different Number Choices”).
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where they exist) at a time before or after the time of decision. So my
analysis will be more generic.
What is the difficulty? It arises because prioritarians espouse
60
what has been termed the “person affecting principle.” There are
various formulations of the principle in the literature but, roughly, it
says that one outcome is better than another in virtue of being better
for individual persons. Outcomes are not morally good or bad in
some impersonal sense; rather, the moral goodness of an outcome is
derivative of its goodness for persons.
The person-affecting principle flows naturally from the fairnessbased account of prioritarianism that I adopt. Morality, on this view,
is the set of norms that derives from a desire to fairly and impartially
respect the claims—claims to well-being—of different human persons.
Indeed, the person-affecting principle is bound up with welfarism
more generally. If we give up the premise that outcomes are morally
better or worse just in virtue of being better or worse for persons,
what would justify the insistence that the ranking of outcomes must
be solely a function of well-being? Why not, for example, allow considerations quite distinct from the well-being of humans, or even animals, to influence the ranking—for example, the intrinsic value of
ecosystems?
But consider, now, a pair of outcomes, x and y, such that one individual, Jill, exists in x but not y. It would seem that y is neither
worse for Jill than x, nor better for Jill than x. Why? Surely there is a
conceptual connection between “worse for” and “worse off than.”
Outcome w is worse for Steve than outcome z iff: were outcome w to
be the actual outcome, Steve would be worse off than he would have
been if outcome z had been the actual outcome. But: were outcome y
to be the actual outcome, Jill would not have the property of being
worse off, or better off, than she would have been had x been the actual outcome, because Jill does not exist in outcome y.
The conceptual connection between “worse for” and “worse off
than” also means, it seems, that the outcome x in which Jill exists is
neither better for her than nonexistence, nor worse for her than nonexistence. Why? It is not the case that Jill, in outcome x, is better off
or worse off than she would have been in outcome y, because she
would not have existed if outcome y had been the case. Lest this ob60 For a recent discussion of the person-affecting principle with reference to prioritarianism, see Holtug, supra note 21. Seminal discussions of the principle and its implications for
population policy include Narveson’s and Parfit’s. See PARFIT, supra note 41, at 391–417;
Narveson, supra note 57.
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servation not persuade, a different route to the same conclusion is
that x cannot be better or worse for Jill than y, because x is better for
Jill than y only if y is worse for Jill than x, and x is worse for Jill than y
only if y is better for Jill than x. But the previous paragraph established, seemingly, that y is neither better nor worse for Jill than x.
We have reasoned ourselves to the proposition that outcomes in
which potential nonexistents exist are neither better nor worse for
them than outcomes in which they do not exist, nor is nonexistence
better or worse for them than outcomes in which they do exist. This
proposition, together with the person-affecting principle, implies that
a potential nonexistent should be ignored in comparing an outcome in
61
which she exists to one in which she does not. In other words, we
have reached the conclusion that the interests of potential nonexistents should be discounted to zero in comparing such pairs of outcomes. Grappling with that unpalatable conclusion is the nub of the
“non-identity problem,” as I see it, in the context of prioritarianism.
One response is to accept the conclusion. The ranking of outcomes x and y should be just a function of the well-being of individuals who exist in both outcomes. This conclusion, however, is intuitively unpalatable. Jill, who exists in x but not y, might have a very
good life indeed in x. Should that not count as a reason in favor of x?
Alternatively, Jill’s life in x might be hellish—a life of unremitting
pain. Should that not count as a reason against x?
Accepting the conclusion also yields a grave formal difficulty.
There is very strong reason to think that the ranking of outcomes
generated by any plausible consequentialist view should be transitive.
If x is morally better than y, and y morally better than z, then x is
morally better than z. But ranking pairs of outcomes by ignoring individuals who exist in one but not both outcomes yields intransitivi62
ties, as Table 1 shows:
Table 1. Potential Nonexistents and Intransitivity
Outcomes
Individuals

x

y

z

Henry

5

6

4

Jane

NE

1

4

Sally

10

10

10

61 Note that we have reasoned ourselves to this conclusion independent of whether potential nonexistents have very good or very bad lives in outcomes where they exist.
62

See BROOME, Value, supra note 57.
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Jane does not exist in x. Any prioritarian SWF will rank the vector of utilities (6,10) over (5,10); will rank the vector of utilities
(4,4,10) over (6,1,10); and will rank the vector of utilities (5,10) over
(4,10). So if we ignore Jane in comparing outcomes x and y, and in
comparing outcomes x and z, we produce the intransitivity y better
than x, z better than y, and x better than z.
A different response to the problem of potential nonexistents is
to reject the person-affecting principle. Where Jill exists in x but not
y, one might say that facts about her well-being in x create an impersonal reason relevant to the ranking of x and y. This is the position
63
that Derek Parfit adopts in Reasons and Persons. As just discussed,
however, rejecting the person-affecting principle is not a comfortable
position for prioritarians.
A third possibility is to reject the proposition that as between an
outcome x in which a person exists and an outcome y in which she
does not, neither outcome is better nor worse for her than the other.
I tentatively suggest that this proposition should indeed be rejected—
by rejecting the supposed conceptual connection between “worse for”
64
and “worse off than.”
In general, a ranking of life histories (as I see it) does not involve
comparing the properties of an individual in some outcome to the
properties of that very same individual in some other outcome. Consider the comparison of life history (x; i) to life history (y; j), where i
and j are distinct individuals. That comparison is undertaken (as I see
it) by asking whether fully informed, fully rational, self-interested individuals would prefer to be i-in-x or j-in-y. It does not depend upon,
or imply, the premise that one particular person is better or worse off
in x than he would have been in y, or has or lacks some property in x
that he lacks or has in y.
Similarly, a comparison of a life history (x; i) to nonexistence
does not depend upon, or imply, the premise that some particular individual (i) is better off existing than he would have been not existing.
Rather, it involves asking whether fully-informed, fully-rational, self65
interested individuals would extendedly prefer to be i-in-x rather

63

PARFIT, supra note 41, at 378, 447.

64

Nils Holtug argues, in a different way, that an individual can be better or worse off existing or not existing, and therefore that non-identity problems do not jeopardize the personaffecting principle. See Holtug, supra note 57; Holtug, supra note 21; Nils Holtug, Utility, Priority and Possible People, 11 UTILITAS 16 (1999) [hereinafter Holtug, Utility].
65 To be sure, where an outcome set involves potential nonexistents, one needs to ask:
whose extended preferences should we look to in comparing life histories? In the core case, one
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than not existing at all. To say that (x; i) is better for i than nonexistence is just to say that the answer to this question is affirmative. To
say that (x; i) is worse for i than nonexistence is to say that its answer
is negative.
It might be objected that it is incoherent for someone to ask herself whether she has an extended preference in favor of a given life
history, as compared to nonexistence. But this question seems perfectly intelligible. Indeed, the thought experiment of comparing life
histories to nonexistence is a central part of the prioritarian framework, as I see it. Even in the “core case” of a fixed and finite population, we need a “zero point” to help calibrate the utility scale—and
we most readily do that by considering whether individuals would
66
prefer or disprefer various life histories to nonexistence.
Fully elaborating the analysis sketched here would mean grappling with subtle issues involving existence, modality, personhood,
properties, and extended preferences—an enterprise I cannot undertake at greater length in this Article. The analysis might well founder
on closer inspection. Still, I tentatively embrace the following position. Existence can be better or worse for an individual than nonexistence. Nonexistence can be better or worse for an individual than existence. Where an outcome set contains potential nonexistents, their
interests should be taken into account by assigning them a utility level
of zero in the outcomes where they do not exist.
Assigning them a utility level of zero, and then doing what?
Imagine, first, that an outcome set contains potential nonexistents,
but the same number N of individuals exist in all outcomes. In that
N

case, the answer is straightforward. Use the formula

 g (u ( x))
i 1

i

to

rank the outcomes.
Imagine, next, that the outcome set contains potential nonexistents, and that the number of individuals who exist in each outcome is
not the same. This brings us to the thorny issue of variation in population size, which I will discuss below.
Two other responses to the non-identity problem bear mention.
One response, suggested by Partha Dasgupta, is to make the ranking

looks to the extended preferences of the N individuals. What happens outside the core case? I
lack space to pursue that question here.
66 John Broome denies that a life history can be better or worse for a person than nonexistence. He therefore pursues a different approach to fixing the zero level, which identifies a
neutral level for continuing to live, and then defines a neutral life as one which is constantly at
this neutral level. See BROOME, supra note 43, at 66–68, 233–35, 241–53.
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of outcomes relative to a population. For each outcome x, we can
rank the entire set O of outcomes relative to the individuals who exist
67
in x. A difficulty here is that this approach may end up giving us
very little moral guidance. At the end of the day, to decide what to
do, we need a single ranking of the outcome set, not just a set of relative rankings.
Another response, suggested by Josh Parsons, is “actualism.”
Roughly, we compare x and y by looking to the interests of individuals who have actually existed, or will actually exist. Assuming determinism, the actual past and future population of the universe is now
fixed. Under “actualism,” it is their well-being that drives the ranking
68
of all outcomes. This approach, however, produces deep paradoxes,
69
as Caspar Hare has shown.
B.

Variation in Population Size

Assume that we assign individuals who exist in some but not all
70
outcomes a utility of zero in the outcomes where they do not exist.
In cases where the population number is variable, we could rank outcomes using the following prioritarian formula: outcome x is as least
N ( x)

as good as outcome y iff

N ( y)

 g (u ( x))   g (u ( y)) , where N(x) is the
i 1

i

i 1

i

number of individuals who exist in x and N(y) the number of individuals who exist in y. Call this the “total” prioritarian approach.
Unfortunately, it runs smack into what Derek Parfit calls the “repug71
nant conclusion.”
The repugnant conclusion is often presented as a problem for
utilitarianism. Imagine an outcome x in which there are N individuals.
67 See PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITUTION 377–97
(1993). Dasgupta’s approach is actually somewhat more complicated than simply ranking the
outcomes relative to each population. For a clear description and critical discussion, see
BROOME, Value, supra note 57; BROOME, supra note 43, at 157–63.
68

See Parsons, supra note 57.

69

See Hare, supra note 57.

70

Note that this could happen in two ways: (1) by following the approach I recommend
(coupling the person-affecting principle with the position that nonexistence can be better or
worse for a person than existence), or (2) by following an impersonal approach. See supra text
accompanying notes 60–63.
71 See PARFIT, supra note 41, at 381–90. There is a substantial literature on the repugnant
conclusion and other population-size problems. Two recent, authoritative contributions, which
also cite much of the prior literature, are BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 34, at 129–208; and
BROOME, supra note 43. For discussions with specific reference to prioritarianism, see Campbell Brown, Prioritarianism for Variable Populations, 134 PHIL. STUD. 325 (2007); Holtug, Utility, supra note 64; Brown, supra note 21, at 187–223.
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The average lifetime well-being in x is a very high level L. To
sharpen the case, imagine that everyone in x is at lifetime well-being
level L. Outcome x might seem like a very good outcome indeed—
particularly if N is large. What could be better than to have lots of
people at a very high level of well-being?
However, ranking outcomes in accordance with “total” utilitarianism—that is, ranking x as being at least as good as y iff
N ( x)

N ( y)

i 1

i 1

 ui ( x) 

 u ( y) —has the following unpleasant implication: for any
i

positive level of well-being L* < L, however close to zero L* might
be, there is some outcome y in which everyone is at level L*, and yet
72
y is better than x. Consider the outcome y in which there are M individuals, where M > NL/L*. L* might be a life barely worth living; L
might be an absolutely terrific life. And yet ranking outcomes using
N ( x)

the formula, x at least as good as y iff

N ( y)

 u ( x)   u ( y) , forces us to
i 1

i

i 1

i

the conclusion that y is a better outcome than x. “Total” utilitarianism implies the repugnant conclusion that we can always “compensate” for a loss in average individual well-being, all the way down to
barely above zero, by a sufficiently large expansion of the population.
The repugnant conclusion is no less a problem for “total” prioritarianism. Assume that there are N individuals who exist in x and
who are all at lifetime well-being level L in x. Consider again any
positive level L* of lifetime well-being, however close to zero. Then
once again there is some outcome y in which everyone is at level L*,
and yet y is better than x. Indeed, because “total” prioritarianism
sums a strictly increasing and concave transformation of individuals’
utility, it can be shown that the expansion of the population required
to make y better than x is less than the number required in the utili73
tarian case. It is less than NL/L*. Ranking outcomes by simply
72 Outcome sets are structured to be responsive to decisionmakers’ bounded rationality
and thus may well exclude some logically possible outcomes. So, strictly, the worry is that there
is some possible outcome set which includes both an x in which everyone lives at level L, and a y
in which everyone lives at L*, arbitrarily close to zero—and that the “total” formula, applied to
this outcome set, ranks y over x.
73 More precisely, the claims in this paragraph as well as the remaining paragraphs in this
Section are true if the strictly increasing and concave function used by the prioritarian to trans-

form individual utility—the g(.) function in the formula

w( x) 

N ( x)

 g (u ( x)) —is normalized
i 1

i

so that g(0) = 0. See BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 34, at 165 (assuming such normalization in
discussion of generalized utilitarianism). In the case of “total” prioritarianism, this normalization means that adding a person with utility zero (a person whose life is as good as nonexistence) to an outcome does not affect the w-value of the outcome.
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summing a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of individual utility means that the loss in social value in moving an individual
from L to L* is less than proportional to the social gain realized by
moving an individual from 0 to L*. This is uncontroversial, for prioritarians, in the core case of a fixed population. But it has the unpleasant consequence, once population size is allowed to vary, that it is
even easier for “total” prioritarians to use an expansion of the population as a way to offset losses in average individual well-being than
for the “total” utilitarian.
Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson have
undertaken an exhaustive, formal analysis of the repugnant conclusion and possible responses within the context of utilitarianism, pri74
oritarianism, and other SWFs. I refer the reader to their work. One
possibility, for prioritarians, is to switch from “total” to “average”
prioritarianism.
Assign each outcome z a value equaling
N (z)
1
 g (ui ( x)) and rank them accordingly. This is, of course, the
N  z  i 1
prioritarian analogue of “average” utilitarianism.
However, “average” prioritarianism has very counterintuitive
conclusions.
First, it violates what Blackorby, Bossert, and
Donaldson call the “negative expansion principle.” It should never
be possible to improve an outcome by adding individuals with negative utility. But, in the case of “average” prioritarianism, this is possi75
ble.
Second, “average” prioritarianism violates a separability-across76
persons axiom that I see as part and parcel of prioritarianism. Con-

Assume, therefore, that g(0) = 0 and that in some outcome x there are N individuals at
level L. Consider a positive level of utility L*, however small. Let M = NL/L*. M is the
“break-even” value for the total utilitarian. The total utilitarian says that an outcome with M
individuals at L* is just as good as x; that outcomes with more than M individuals at L* are better than x; and that outcomes with fewer than M individuals at L* are worse than x. Observe,
now, that L* = (N/M)L. Because g(0) = 0, and because g(.) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, it follows that g(L*) > (N/M)g(L), with both g(L*) and g(L) positive.
Rearranging terms, we see that M > Ng(L)/g(L*). The “break-even” population size
M+ for the “total” prioritarian—such that an outcome with M+ individuals at L* is just as good
as x, outcomes with more than M+ individuals at L* are better than x, and outcomes with fewer
than M+ individuals are worse than x—is just Ng(L)/g(L*). So M+ is less than M.
For similar observations to the effect that the “total” prioritarian finds it even easier
than the “total” utilitarian to use population expansion to compensate for reductions in average
well-being levels, see Brown, supra note 21, at 210–17; Holtug, Utility, supra note 64, at 32–35.
74

BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 34, at 129–208.

75

See id. at 172.

76

Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson discuss separability-across-persons under the head-
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sider outcomes x and y, where Jim is equally well off in x and y.
Separability-across-persons means that the particular level of Jim’s
well-being should not influence the ranking of x and y. It should not
matter whether Jim is at level L+ in both outcomes, or instead at level
L++ in both outcomes, or instead at level L+++ in both outcomes,
and so forth. After all, whatever Jim’s well-being level happens to be,
he has no claim in favor of x over y, or y over x. Whatever that level
happens to be, he is equally well off in both outcomes. But “average”
prioritarianism can readily violate separability-across-persons.
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson suggest a different response
to the repugnant conclusion. Adding an individual to the population
should be seen as increasing social welfare iff the individual is above a
“critical level”: a positive level of well-being c* which is better than
77
nonexistence. In the case of prioritarianism, the “critical level” formula becomes: x is at least as good as y iff
N ( x)

N ( y)

 [ g (u ( x))  g (c*)]   [ g (u ( y))  g (c*)] .
i

i 1

i 1

i

The upshot of this “criti-

cal level” approach is that expanding the population by adding lives
that are barely worth living—lives which are above zero, but below
the critical level—is seen as making the outcome worse. (By contrast,
“total” prioritarianism always sees such an addition as improving the
78
outcomes.) The critical level, like other moral parameters, might be
set by reflecting on hypothetical cases.
Critical-level prioritarianism is not problem-free. Although it
avoids what Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson call the “negative
expansion principle,” it violates another principle involving negative
79
utilities that they call “priority for lives worth living.” This says that,
for every outcome x in which everyone’s well-being is positive, and
every outcome y in which everyone’s well-being is negative, x must be
ranked better than y. How can it ever be better to have a world in
which everyone is better off not existing, than a world in which everyone is better off existing?
Perhaps the best solution, on balance, is to revert to “total” pri-

ing of various “independence” axioms. See id. at 159–60.
77

They generalize this formula by contemplating a range of critical levels. See id. at 219–
21, 248–52. They also consider other sorts of variations, for example “restricted” and “numbersensitive” critical-level views. See id. at 136–51, 165–71. John Broome argues for critical-level
utilitarianism. See BROOME, supra note 43, at 254–64.
78
79

For example, the inequality-aversion parameter in the Atkinsonian SWF.

BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 34, at 166 (discussing properties of critical-level generalized utilitarianism, in particular where the critical level is positive).
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80

oritarianism and accept the repugnant conclusion. In x, there are N
individuals at a high level of well-being L. In y, those individuals are
brought down to a very low positive level L*, but many more individuals exist who do not exist in x. Each such individual has a claim
to y rather than x (at least if one accepts the “solution” to the nonidentity problem I offered in the prior section). Outcome y is better
for each such individual than nonexistence, and nonexistence is worse
for her—if only by a little bit. Should we not recognize that the number of such claims can become sufficiently large to counterbalance the
claims of the x-world existents not to have their well-being lowered
81
from L to L*?
What emerges here is that “solutions” to the non-identity problem and the problem of variation in population size are linked via the
person-affecting principle. If one concludes that an outcome in which
some individual does not exist can be worse for her—and thus that
the person-affecting principle can be retained as a general principle
for ranking outcomes, even where the population is not fixed—the
“repugnant” conclusion will seem, on reflection, less repugnant. By
shifting from x to y we achieve an outcome which would be better for
many individuals—better than the zero level of nonexistence—at the
cost of some well-off individuals being worse off. By contrast, from
an impersonal perspective, it may seem that a world in which many
people have lives barely worth living is ugly and squalid and always
yields less value than a world in which a smaller population lives well,
regardless of how much larger the population in the first case.
C.

Infinite Population

Imagine that each outcome in the outcome set contains an infinite number of individuals. This could arise in combination with a
non-identity problem. But it could also arise quite independent of a
non-identity problem. For example, imagine that an infinite number
of individuals are born and exist in x, and the very same individuals
are born and exist in y. Some of the individuals have different utility
80

However, it should be noted that difficulties arise in marrying “total” prioritarianism

with the Atkinsonian SWF,

1
1 

N

 u ( x)
i 1

1

i

, specifically in cases where the inequality aver-

sion parameter  is greater than or equal to 1. In such cases, g(0) is not zero, but rather is undefined. I will not attempt to resolve how the proponent of the Atkinsonian SWF (which is an attractive version of prioritarianism in fixed-population cases, for reasons I have discussed
elsewhere, see sources cited supra note 1), might address this difficulty.
81 If one accepts the argument in this case, then it also surely works where the individuals
in x do not exist in y and others take their place.
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levels in x than in y. How shall we rank the two outcomes?
A quite substantial body of scholarship in economic theory examines this sort of problem. This literature was initiated with pioneering
82
articles by Frank Ramsey, Tjalling Koopmans, and Peter Diamond,
and focuses in particular on the problem of ranking countably infinite
83
utility streams that extend forward in time from an initial period.

82 See Peter A. Diamond, The Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams, 33 ECONOMETRICA
170 (1965); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience, 28
ECONOMETRICA 287 (1960); F.P. Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543
(1928).
83 The economic theory literature on infinite utility streams is very large. Recent contributions include: Geir Asheim, Tapan Mitra & Bertil Tungodden, A New Equity Condition for
Infinite Utility Streams and the Possibility of Being Paretian, in INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
AND SUSTAINABILITY 55 (John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura eds., 2007); Geir B. Asheim &
Bertil Tungodden, Resolving Distributional Conflicts Between Generations, 24 ECON. THEORY
221 (2004); Claude d’Aspremont, Formal Welfarism and Intergenerational Equity, in
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 113 (John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura
eds., 2007); Kuntal Banerjee & Tapan Mitra, On the Continuity of Ethical Social Welfare Orders
on Infinite Utility Streams, 30 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 1 (2008); Kuntal Banerjee, On the Equity-Efficiency Trade off in Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams, 93 ECON. LETTERS 63 (2006);
Kuntal Banerjee, On the Extension of the Utilitarian and Suppes-Sen Social Welfare Relations to
Infinite Utility Streams, 27 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 327 (2006) [hereinafter Banerjee, On the
Extension of the Utilitarian]; Kuntal Banerjee & Tapan Mitra, On the Impatience Implications of
Paretian Social Welfare Functions, 43 J. MATH. ECON. 236 (2007); Kaushik Basu & Tapan Mitra,
Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams with Intergenerational Equity: The Impossibility of Being
Paretian, 71 ECONOMETRICA 1557 (2003) [hereinafter Basu & Mitra, Aggregating Infinite Utility
Streams]; Kaushik Basu & Tapan Mitra, Possibility Theorems for Equitably Aggregating Infinite
Utility Streams, in INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 69 (John Roemer &
Kotaro Suzumura eds., 2007); Kaushik Basu & Tapan Mitra, Utilitarianism for Infinite Utility
Streams: A New Welfare Criterion and its Axiomatic Characterization, 133 J. ECON. THEORY 350
(2007) [hereinafter Basu & Mitra, Utilitarianism for Infinite Utility Streams]; Walter Bossert et
al., Ordering Infinite Utility Streams, 135 J. ECON. THEORY 579 (2007); Graciela Chichilnisky,
An Axiomatic Approach to Sustainable Development, 13 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 231 (1996);
Juan Alfonso Crespo et al., On the Impossibility of Representing Infinite Utility Streams, 40
ECON. THEORY 47 (2009); Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Michel, Intertemporal Equity and the Extension of the Ramsey Criterion, 39 J. MATH. ECON. 777 (2003); Chiaki Hara et al., Continuity
and Egalitarianism in the Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams, 31 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE
179 (2008); Luc Lauwers, Intertemporal Objective Functions: Strong Pareto Versus Anonymity,
35 MATH. SOC. SCI. 37 (1998); Tapan Mitra & Kaushik Basu, On the Existence of Paretian Social
Welfare Quasi-Orderings for Infinite Utility Streams with Extended Anonymity, in
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 85 (John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura
eds., 2007); Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Equity Among Generations, 48 ECONOMETRICA 1251
(1980); Yongsheng Xu, Pareto Principle and Intergenerational Equity: Immediate Impatience,
Universal Indifference, and Impossibility, in INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY 100 (John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura eds., 2007); William Zame, Can Intergenerational Equity be Operationalized?, 2 THEORETICAL ECON. 187 (2007); Geir B. Asheim,
Claude d’Aspremont & Kuntal Banerjee, Generalized Time-Invariant Overtaking, (Départment
des sciences économiques de l’Université catholique de Louvain, Working Paper No. 2008039,
2008); Chiaki Hara, Kotaro Suzumura & Tomoichi Shinotsuka, On the Possibility of Continu-
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Each stream s has the structure (u1, u2, . . .), where u1 is the utility in
the first time period, u2 in the second, and so forth. This literature is
quite technical, but its essence is clear: it may well be impossible to
rank infinite utility streams in a manner which is neutral between earlier and later utilities once we couple a time-neutrality requirement
with other, seemingly plausible, axioms.
Time-neutrality can be formally expressed via an “anonymity”
axiom, which says: if stream s and stream s* are permutations of each
other, then s and s* must be ranked as equally good. In the infinity
context, it is important to distinguish between different variants of the
anonymity axiom. A weaker anonymity axiom says that s and s* must
be ranked the same if they are finite permutations of each other. A
stronger anonymity axiom requires indifference to all permutations,
84
including infinite permutations.
85
Diamond establishes the following result. Imagine that we aim
to have a complete ordering of infinite utility streams. We require,
further, that this ordering satisfy the principle of Pareto superiority,
meaning in this context that if the utility in every period in stream s*
is at least as large as the utility in stream s in that period, and if the
utility in at least one period in stream s* is strictly greater than the

ous, Paretian, and Egalitarian Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams (Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-12, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976021.
There is also a smaller philosophical literature of infinity problems. This literature is
more general than the economic theory literature just cited, because it discusses the problem of
ranking worlds with an infinite number of “locations” of utility—whether or not those are organized in the form of a “stream” that begins with an initial period and never ends. See, e.g.,
Donniell Fishkind et al., New Inconsistencies in Infinite Utilitarianism: Is Every World Good,
Bad or Neutral?, 80 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 178 (2002); Luc Lauwers & Peter Vallentyne, Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better, 20 ECON. & PHIL. 307 (2004); Tim Mulgan, Transcending the Infinite Utility Debate, 80 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 164 (2002); Peter Vallentyne &
Shelly Kagan, Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory, 94 J. PHIL. 5 (1997).
84 Formally, the weak anonymity axiom can be articulated as follows. Consider the set
T = {1, 2, . . .}, which denotes the periods in a utility stream. Function p is a permutation if it is a
bijection (one-to-one, onto mapping) from T onto itself. It is a finite permutation if all but a
finite number of elements of T are mapped onto themselves. We can then say that stream s* is a
permutation of stream s if

uts*  u sp (t )

for all t and that stream s* is a finite permutation of s if p
s
”
t

is a finite permutation. (The term “ u

simply means the utility in stream s in period t.) The

weak anonymity axiom requires that s* and s be ranked as equally good whenever s* is a finite
permutation of s. See, e.g., Asheim & Tungodden, supra note 83, at 223; Bossert et al., supra
note 83, at 581; Fleurbaey & Michel, supra note 83, at 782; Svensson, supra note 83, at 1252.
The strong anonymity axiom requires indifference to any permutation, even one that is not finite. See, e.g., Fleurbaey & Michel, supra note 83, at 782–83.
For a full discussion of possible anonymity requirements in the infinity context, and
their consistency with various forms of the Pareto principle, see id.
85

See Diamond, supra note 82.
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86

utility in s in that period, then s* must be ranked higher than s. If we
further stipulate that this ordering satisfy a continuity property as well
as weak anonymity, impossibility results. No ordering of infinite
streams can be complete, continuous, satisfy Pareto superiority, and
satisfy even the weak anonymity axiom of indifference to finite permutations. Building on this striking finding, Basu and Mitra show
that there is no ordering of utility streams which is complete, representable by a SWF, satisfies Pareto superiority, and also satisfies the
87
weak anonymity axiom.
Do these findings wholly undermine the desire to preserve timeneutrality once we enter the domain of infinite utility streams? The
Diamond and Basu/Mitra articles focus on the problem of producing
a complete ordering of infinite streams; this is true of much, if not all,
of the literature. But it is far from clear why completeness is a norma88
tively compelling axiom. As I suggested earlier, and have argued at
89
length elsewhere, even in the case of a fixed, finite population, an attractive moral theory such as prioritarianism may produce only an incomplete ordering of outcomes—a so-called “quasi-ordering.”
Once we relinquish the completeness requirement, and require
only that the ranking of infinite utility streams be a quasi-ordering,
the ambition to reconcile a measure of time-neutrality and the Pareto
principle becomes more feasible. Svensson notes that there are a variety of criteria for quasi-ordering streams that are consistent both
with the weak anonymity axiom and with the Pareto superiority prin90
ciple.
One such criterion is the so-called “overtaking” criterion.
The idea is that one stream “overtakes” another if, after a certain
number of periods, the sum of utility from the beginning is always larger with the first stream. More formally, the overtaking criterion
says: stream s is at least as good as stream s* iff there exists a time T*
T

such that, for all T > T*,

T

u  u
t 1

s
t

t 1

s*
t

, where uts is the utility in

86 Throughout the discussion of infinite utility streams, this is what I mean by the principle of Pareto superiority.
87

See Basu & Mitra, Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams, supra note 83.

88

Some scholars in the infinite-utility-stream literature have investigated the possibility
of relaxing completeness. See, e.g., Asheim & Tungodden, supra note 83; Basu & Mitra, Utilitarianism for Infinite Utility Streams, supra note 83; Bossert et al., supra note 83; Hara et al., supra note 83.
89 See ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY, supra note 1; see also ADLER & POSNER, supra note 18, at 161–62 (arguing that outcomes may be incomparable with respect to overall wellbeing).
90

See Svensson, supra note 83; see also Bossert et al., supra note 83, at 579–80.
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91

stream s in period t.
Note that there is no discount factor in this formula; it looks,
rather, to the undiscounted sum of utilities. If, instead, we compare
utility streams using the simple discounted sum of utilities


 D(t )(u ) , there is a violation of the weak anonymity axiom.
t 1

s
t

Geoffrey Heal has criticized the overtaking criterion because it
fails to be neutral between the following sort of pair of utility streams.
Imagine that s = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) and s* = (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .). Then s is
ranked as better than s* by the overtaking criterion but time92
neutrality would seem to require that s and s* be ranked as equal.
Note, however, that indifference between (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) and
(0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) is not required by the weak anonymity axiom. The two
streams are not finite permutations of each other; they are infinite
permutations. Neutrality between (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) and (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) is
required by the strong anonymity axiom. However, it can be shown
that there is no way to produce even a quasi-ordering of utility
streams which (1) respects the principle of Pareto superiority and (2)
respects the strong anonymity axiom, i.e., indifference to infinite
permutations. The following example illustrates that strong anonym-

91 The overtaking criterion originates with von Weizsacker & Atsumi. See Hiroshi
Atsumi, Neoclassical Growth and the Efficient Program of Capital Accumulation, 32 REV.
ECON. STUD. 127 (1965); Carl Christian von Weizsacker, Existence of Optimal Programs of Accumulation for an Infinite Time Horizon, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 85 (1965). For recent discussions, see Asheim & Tungodden, supra note 83, at 226–28; Banerjee, On the Extension of the
Utilitarian, supra note 83, at 333–35; Basu & Mitra, Utilitarianism for Infinite Utility Streams,
supra note 83, at 356–63; Fleurbaey & Michel, supra note 83, at 786–87; Svensson, supra note 83,
at 1253. For a variation on the overtaking criterion, see Asheim et al., supra note 83 (“generalized time-invariant overtaking”).
92 See GEOFFREY HEAL, VALUING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
T

SUSTAINABILITY 65–67 (1998). Note that, for each odd value of T,

T

u  u
t 1

s
t

t 1

T

s = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) and s* = (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .). For every case where T is even,

s*
t

—where
T

u  u
t 1

s
t

t 1

s*
t

.

Therefore, if we set T* equal to zero, for all T > T*, the sum of utilities up to period T is at least
as large (greater than or equal) in s as in s*. However, it can be seen that there is no T+ such
T

that, for all T > T+,

u
t 1

s*
t

T

  uts

—because the cumulative sum of utilities in s* is always

t 1

less than that in s in odd periods.
Because s is at least as good as s* by the overtaking criterion, and s* is not at least as
good as s, it follows that s is better than s* by the overtaking criterion—which is what Heal in
turn criticizes.
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93

ity and the principle of Pareto superiority are mutually inconsistent.
Table 2. The Conflict Between Anonymity and Pareto Superiority
Period
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

...

Stream s

1

3/2

1/3

7/4

1/5

11/6

1/7

15/8

1/9

...

Stream s*

1

7/4

3/2

11/6

1/3

15/8

1/5

19/10

1/7

...

Strong anonymity requires that the two streams be ranked as equally
good, while the Pareto superiority principle requires that the second
stream be ranked as better than the first.
In short, criticisms of the overtaking criterion that point to its
lack of indifference in cases of infinite permutations—such as
Heal’s—are not particularly persuasive, because what these cases
really evidence is a generic impossibility, rather than a specific flaw of
the overtaking criterion.
A different point is that the overtaking criterion is a utilitarian
criterion. It compares two streams by comparing the sum of utilities
up to each point in time. However, it is straightforward to produce a
prioritarian variant of the overtaking criterion which sums a strictly
increasing and strictly concave g-function of utilities. Prioritarian
overtaking says that stream s is at least as good as stream s* iff there
is a time T* such that, for all T > T*,

T

T

t 1

t 1

 g (uts )  g (uts* ) .

To be sure, the prioritarian criterion thus formulated is applicable
to the problem of ranking infinite utility streams. For purposes of social choice, we need to rank outcomes. In the infinite-stream setup,
there is a single utility in each period. But a framework for intertemporal social choice should, of course, allow for the possibility that
multiple individuals, possibly at different levels of (lifetime) utility,
may exist at the same time.

93

Stream s is produced by taking the alternating sequence 0, 1/2, -2/3, 3/4, -4/5, 5/6, . . . ,
and adding 1 to each term. Stream s* is produced by rearranging the terms of stream s as follows: keep the first term in place, shift the second term (3/2) one to the right, and, for every
other term shift it two to the right if its denominator is odd, and two to the left if its denominator is even.
On the inconsistency between Pareto superiority and strong anonymity (indifference to
infinite permutations), see Asheim & Tungodden, supra note 83, at 229. Asheim and Tungodden provide a simpler example of the conflict. The example I provide here, however, involves a
case in which one stream is a permutation of another, yet is strictly better in all but a single time
period.
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However, it is easy to generalize the prioritarian overtaking criterion to cover this case. Assume that the temporal structure of the
universe is the same in all outcomes: time begins with an initial period, and continues ad infinitum. In each outcome in each period,
there are a finite number of individuals who are born, possibly zero;
94
this number need not be the same in all the outcomes. Let us say
that N(x, t) is the number of individuals born in outcome x during or
before period t. In a given outcome, assign the individuals who exist
in that outcome numbers corresponding to their date of birth. So individuals numbered 1 to N(x,1) in outcome x are born in period 1 in
outcome x; individuals numbered N(x,1) + 1 to N(x,2) are born in period 2, and so forth. Then the prioritarian overtaking criterion says
that x is at least as good as y iff there is a time T* such that, for all
N ( x ,T )

T > T*,


i 1

g (ui ( x)) 

N ( y ,T )


i 1

g (ui ( y )) . As in the core case of a fixed and

finite population, ui(x) is the lifetime utility of individual i in outcome
x.
In the core case of a fixed and finite population, as noted earlier,
N

the prioritarian criterion

 g (u ( x))
i 1

i

satisfies a number of axioms: the

Pareto indifference principle, the principle of Pareto superiority, the
Pigou-Dalton principle, separability across individuals, and anonym95
ity. In the new setup, involving an infinite future, the prioritarian
overtaking criterion also satisfies Pareto indifference, Pareto superi96
ority, Pigou-Dalton, and separability across individuals. As for ano94 However, I will assume that an individual is born on the very same date in all outcomes
where she exists. Although this assumption is not entailed by the nature of personal identity,
see supra text accompanying note 44, relaxing the assumption creates difficulties for the prioritarian overtaking criterion as presented here. Note that, if some individual is born later in outcome x than outcome y, outcome x might be Pareto superior to y and yet the sum
N ( y ,T )

N ( x ,T )


i 1

g (ui ( x)) might be less than the sum


i 1

g (ui ( y )) , for values of T in between the in-

dividual’s birth date in y and x. This might yield inconsistencies between the prioritarian overtaking criterion and the principle of Pareto superiority if an infinite number of individuals have
different birth dates in x and y. Similar difficulties can arise with the Pareto indifference principle. How it might be possible to relax the assumption that an individual is born on the very
same date in all outcomes where she exists is a question I leave for another day.
95 See supra Part I.
96 For purposes of applying these criteria to an outcome set with potential nonexistents,
who exist in some but not all outcomes, such individuals should be assigned a utility of zero in
the outcomes where they do not exist. Then Pareto indifference requires that outcome x be
ranked as equally good as y if (1) every individual who exists in both outcomes is equally well
off in both, and (2) every individual who exists in one but not both outcomes has a utility of zero
in the outcome where she exists. Pareto superiority requires that outcome x be ranked as better
than outcome y if the utility assigned each individual in x is at least as great as the utility assigned her in y, and there are some individuals assigned strictly greater utility—where, by “the
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nymity, it fails to be indifferent to infinite permutations of utility, but
97
it is indifferent to finite permutations.
On balance, this seems a
plausible approach for prioritarians to use in ranking outcomes involving an infinite future.
To be sure, the prioritarian overtaking criterion is not a complete
solution to infinity problems. It tells us how to rank an outcome set in
which time has a beginning but no end in all outcomes. It gives no
guidance in the following sorts of cases: (1) time has a beginning and
continues ad infinitum in some outcomes, while in others it has a beginning and ends after a finite number of periods (this is a plausible
outcome set if the decisionmaker is uncertain whether the universe
will end); (2) time has no beginning and no end in some outcomes; (3)
the population is infinite in some periods in some outcomes (this may
perhaps be a plausible outcome set if the decisionmaker is interested,
not just in the well-being of the persons who live on Earth—which has
a finite carrying capacity—but the well-being of all intelligent life in
the universe).
A different possible reaction to infinity problems is to deny their
practical relevance. For example, if we are constructing a framework
intended to provide guidance in impartially considering the interests
of the human population of the Earth, and if we can be reasonably
certain not only that Earth had a beginning but also that Earth will
end, then we can be reasonably certain that the morally relevant
population in every outcome will be finite. Of course, it might be objected that this construal of the morally relevant population is too restricted. If individuals born on Earth migrate to Mars, shouldn’t we
utility assigned to each individual,” I mean that individual’s utility if she exists, or zero if she
does not. Pigou-Dalton means that if x and y are identical, except that ui(y) = ui(x)+u,
uj(y) = uj(x)-u, uj(x) > uj(y) > ui(y) > ui(x), where these utilities are the utilities assigned to individuals i and j in outcomes x and y, then y is better than x. Separability means that the ranking
of x and y does not depend on which utilities are assigned to individuals who are assigned the
same utilities in both outcomes.
97 By these terms, in this context, I mean the following. Given an outcome set, there is a
set of all individuals who exist in at least one of the outcomes. A permutation is a bijection
(one-to-one, onto mapping) from this set onto itself. A finite permutation is a permutation with
the property that only a finite number of individuals are mapped onto different individuals. An
infinite permutation is a permutation which is not finite.

The utilities assigned individuals in outcome y are a permutation of the utilities assigned individuals in outcome x if there is some permutation p such that each individual i’s utility in x is the utility of individual p(i) in y. If there exists a finite such p, then y is a finite permutation of x. Less formally, y is a finite permutation of x if there is some finite subset of all the
individuals (those who exist in at least one outcome), such that the utilities assigned to those
individuals in y are a rearrangement of the utilities assigned to them in x, and all individuals not
in the subset are assigned the very same utilities in y and x.
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care about them? But we might be reasonably certain that this universe will end, and thus that the set of individuals born on Earth, plus
their descendants, will be finite in any reasonably possible outcome.
Conclusion
This Article has considered the problem of future generations
within the context of prioritarianism: a moral view which is welfarist
but sensitive to equity. Unlike utilitarianism, a prioritarian approach
gives greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse-off indi98
viduals. On my specific rendering, prioritarianism sees worse-off individuals as having stronger claims to well-being than better-off individuals.
The Article addressed both the “core case,” in which the world’s
99
intertemporal population is fixed and finite (the same N individuals
exist in all possible outcomes, with N a finite number), and departures
from the “core case” discussed in the philosophical and economic lit100
erature, namely non-identity cases, variation in the size of the in101
102
tertemporal population, and an infinite future.
I argued for neutrality between generations in the “core case.” In
N

that case, outcomes should be ranked using the formula

 g (u ( x)) ,
i 1

i

rather than a formula that discounts the well-being of future generaN

tions, such as

 D(b( x; i)) g (u ( x)) , with D(.) a discount factor that dei 1

i

pends on the date individuals are born. A neutralist approach that
ranks policies using the basic formula without a discount factor,
N

 g (u ( x)) , is already sensitive to various important considerations
i

i 1

raised in the literature on discounting, namely opportunity costs, uncertainty, the fact that future generations are likely to be richer, and
103
worries about impoverishing the present for the sake of the future.
Reciprocally, discounting the utilities of future generations would arguably violate the Pareto indifference axiom and, in any event, would
104
violate the anonymity axiom. Anonymity is a formal, welfarist, ex98

See supra Part I.

99

See supra Part II.

100

See supra Part III.A.

101

See supra Part III.B.

102

See supra Part III.C.

103

See supra text accompanying notes 46–56.

104

See supra text accompanying notes 42–45.
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pression of the idea that moral reasoning should be impartial between
persons. It says that if outcome x produces the very same pattern of
well-being as outcome y (i.e., the utility vector for x is a permutation
of the utility vector for y), then x and y are equally good.
Matters become more complicated when we move outside the
“core case.” The Article does not take a firm position on how prioritarianism should handle non-identity cases, variation in population
size, and an infinite future. I did, however, tentatively suggest that
neutrality between current and future generations can plausibly be
preserved even in such cases: in the first two instances, via the “total”
N ( x)

prioritarian formula

 g (u ( x))
i 1

i

(notwithstanding the “repugnant

105

conclusion”); and in the last instance via a prioritarian version of
the “overtaking” criterion, which is at least consistent with a weak
106
version of the anonymity axiom.

105

See supra text accompanying notes 64–67, 80–81.

106

See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.

